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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

COLLEEN :MICKEY,

Case No.
12876

Defcndant-A ppella11t.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENru
STATEMENT 01;' THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
An appeal from the conviction of the crime of
possession for sale of a stimulant drug.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VBR COURT
After a jury verdict against appellant, she was
sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment of
the lower court.
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STATEl\IENT OF THE FACTS
During the trial of CoJleen l\Iickey, Philip Roche,
an undercover police officer for the Ogden City
Police Department testified for the state. His testimony
established the following:
On April 30, 1971, he and Gary Spangler went to
the Avon Apartment Complex located at 2.5th and
Fowler to make a purchase of drugs ( R. 63, 64). Upon
arriving at the complex, the officer and l\Ir. Spangler
went to Apartment 2, knocked an the door and Colleen
l\lickey, appellaut herein, answered the door (H. G4).
After entering the apartment, Officer Roche and
Spangler asked Colleen l\J ickey if she had any "speed"
( ll. 65). H c testified that he asked her once ( R. 68,
80) and she did not hesitate to sell the drugs ( H. G7).
Upon being· asked if she had any "speed" Officer
Roehe testified, " . . . she said the only thing she had
was speed and she said that she wasn't going to sell anymore than five dollars worth because it wouldn't be
worth it to her, so she said she would sell six tabs of
'speed' for a dollar, six tabs for a dollar, period, and
no less than five dollars worth" ( ll. 05) . I Ie also testified he gave her five dollars and appellant gave him
25 tablets of "speed" which she had taken from her
purse (R. 65). Gary Spangler bought one doJlars worth
to take the heat off him ( U. 60) . On cross examination,
Officer Roche testified that Gary Spangler asked Colleen Mickey if she had any grass and she said: "I'm
too hot now. I am only dealing in speed because that is
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what I am using mostly." (R. 77). He purchased the
pills in 'Ve her County ( Il. 64).
Lynette l\Iitehell Nelson testified that if she
bought speefl on the black market, it would cost her
$15.00 for 100 pills or about $5.00 for 25 (R. 109).
This is about the same price as quoted by Colleen
Mickey. If a person were to buy 100 pills, the cost would
he fifteen cents a pill, for 25 pills, the cost is twenty
cents :t pill. Colleen _l\Iickey's price of six for a dollar
comes out to be about sixteen cents per pill. This information clearly shows that black market prices are
similar to the prices set by
l\lickey. Officer
Roche significantly gave five dollars to the appellant
awl receiYed
tablets wrapped in tinfoil instead of 30
as quoted in the purchase price ( R. 65).
l\Irs. Nelson also testified that she was iD and out
of the room because Officer Roche and Spangler made
her nervous (R. 104, 114), and she did not know exactly what went on all the time ( R. 120).
The defendant testified that she had 30 to 35 pills
in her possession for her own use, and that she had no
intention to sell the pills ( R. 128). This is contrary
to the officer's statement that she said she was "dealing" in speed.
Donald Boyd Gunderson, called by the State as an
expert witness testified that he had analyzed the pills
purchased from appellant and they contained a com-

pound known as amphetamine which is a stimulant drug
(R. 95).

POINT I
TI-IE DISTRICT COURT lV AS CORRECT
IN NOT REDUCING THE CIL\RGE FUOl\I

POSSESSION FOH S.ALE OF A S'l'Il\IULAN'I'
DRUG TO POSSESSION.
The appellant mistakenly raises as her first point
on appeal that the District Court erred in not reducing
the charge in the information from possession with intent to sell, to possession. The inforrnation does not
charge the appellant with the crime of possession with
jntent to sell: it charges the appellant with i:lw crime of
possession for sale of a
drug (H. 12, 60).
In State v. Arce, 107 Ariz. 15G, 483 P.2d 1395, 1399,
( 1971), the Supreme Court of Arizona stated:
"The gravarnent of the offense ... is the
possession of narcotics, for sale, as distinguished from the mere possession of narcotics
on the one hand and the actual sale of narcotics
on the other. Previous decisions of this court
have discussed the elements necessary for a
conviction for possession, or for an actual sale,
but this is the first time we have been called
upon to set forth the elements required under
the in-between classification - i.e., possession
for sale."
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The Court then comidercd decisions of other courts
which has dealt specifically with the question and wrote

at 13H9:
"In orcler to cmwict on the more serious offense
of possession of narcotics for sale, the prosecution must not only establish the elements requirecl for a conviction for possession, ... , but
must also show that the possession was for the
purpose of sale. Circmnsta11tial evidence may
he used to show that the accused possessed the
narcotics for sale rather than for his individual
use. "
The Co11rt then considered two California Appellate
del'.isiui1s "·herein it was held that large amounts of
heroin, its quality and the nature of its packaging and
loeation supp01·[(·fl the inference that it was held for
rnle.
In the ca'ie: at Bar the testimonies of Offieer Roehe,
Nelson establish
Colleen 1\1 ickey arnl Lynette
that the appellant was in possession of a stimulant drug
(n. 05, 105, l L>, 128). EYidcnce that this possession
was for the purpose of sale comes not only from all
the facts and ciremnsbmces, but comes out of the mouth
of the defendant herself. Officer Hoche testified that
ColJeen l\lickey, when asked if she had any speed,
quoted him her selling price (It. 05), and when she was
asked if she had any grass, her reply was that she was
too hot, and that she was only ''dealing" in speed because that was what she was using (R. 77). There is
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conflicting testimony as to the purpose for which Colleen l\Iickey possessed the speed. Ifowever, i11
v.

Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P.2cl 805, 809, (1942), (appeal on the <'orffiction of the crime of grand larceny),
this court statetl:
"The defendants contend that a JI of the endence was directly controverted by them at the
trial. ... But the trial court had the witnesses
before it and was convinced that the witt1esscs
called hy the State were telling the truth. It
is not our province m1 appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses when their testimony is in
direct conflict . . . . "
Furthermore, in ,State l'. Ca11fh.lrl, 18 Utah 2d 292, 422
P.2d 196, 197, (l!W7), this court stated:

" ... It is our duty to respect the prerogative
of' the jury as the exclusive judges of the
credibility of the witnesses and as the determiners of the facts.
we assume that
they believed the State's evidence, and we
survey it, together with all fair inferences that
the jury
reasonably draw therefrom, in
the light most favorable to their verdict."
Respondent .;;uhmits that the crime of possession for
sale was prm'ed to the satisfaction of the jury, and
their verdict should be affirmed.
Appellant's second point, subpoint A, lumps under
one argument a matter respondent believes should be
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segragated for consi1leraticn. The point urged by appellant nrnkr suhpoint A is that the officer's testimony
was not corroborated.
POINT II

THE TESTll\IONY OF THE POLICE OFFICER DOES NOT REQUIRE CORROJJORATION.
Hespoudent does ont concede that the testimony of
Officer Hoche was not conohorated by all the facts
arnl circumstances. In meeting the appellant's argument,
we urge that it need not he. In State v. Kasai. 27 Utah
2cl a:w, ..f.!J,3 P.2d l:W.), l:W!> ( lH72), (appeal from a
conviction of unlawfully sel1ing marijuana), this court
said that " ... [T]he condction of a defendant may be
fournled on the purchasers uncotToborated testimony."
To the same effect see: Brool.:s 'l'. United States, 385
F.2d 2/D ( D.C. Cir. l!WI), Bush t'. Unittd States, B7:>
F.2•l ()(>:! (D.C. Cir. HW7), Ploplc 'l'. Rodriguez, 169
C.A. 2d 771, 3H8 P.2d 41, (1959).
A second point argued by appellant's first point
is that the defendant was entrapped into committing the
offense.
POINT III

THE APPELLANT WAS XOT ENTRAPPED.
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In the lower court, no contention was rna<lc that
the issue of entrapment was involYe<l. The issue is
raised for the first time on appeal. Parenthetically, it is
observed that the defense of entrapment usually involves a sale. \Vhile appellant made a sale, the offense
charged was "possession for sale". Appellant has created
confusion by not correctly understanding the charge.

It is therefore clearly understandable why the issue of
entrapment was not raised below. It was not an issue
then, and is not properly one now. In m1y event, appellant did not make it an issue below. In 15trde v. Starlight

Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 40H P.2d !112, nm (HW5),
wherein the defendants incurred a fine arnl revocation
of their nonprofit corporate charter for illcgaIIy seJJing
liquor, raised certain constitutional arguments for the
first time. The Supreme Court said: "This was raised
first time on appeal, and
are not constrainc<l to canvass it". Therefore, respondent contends that in this
case, the issue of entrapment is not properly hefore the
court.
Even if we assume that the issue of entrapment,
as a matter of law, is properly before this court, Officer Roche's testimony clc::uly establishes that the appellant was not entrapped. He testified that he asked her
to sell him some speed (IL 68, 80), and that she did
not hesitate to sell (R. (i7). Other evidentiary facts
from his testimony are discussed above, which conclusively proves the appellant's purpose for possessing
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1he "speed" ancl her willing11ess to sell. In State v.
Ka:wi, supra, at 12H7, this court stated:
"Entrapment is not established, as a matter of law, where there is any substantial evidence in the record from which it may be inf erred that the criminal intent to commit the
particular offense originated in the mind of
the accused. The fact that a government agent
offers to buy narcotics from a suspect,· thus
giving him the opportunity to commit the offense, clues not constitute entrapment."
In State v. Cunningham, (No. 12253, Jan. 30, 1973),
the defendants were charged and cmlYictecl of violating
ll tah Code J\1111. § ;)8-3:1-G ( l) ( l!).J:J. The state law enforl'ernent agents, upon first meeting the defendants,
asked if they could supply them with a large quantity
of LSD. Later they purehased from the defendants
eight tablets of LSD for $20.00. During the trial, the
defense of entrapment was raisecl but the jury convicted the defendants. 011 appeal the court found,
" [ T] hat the conduct of the officers amounted only to
a solicitation of the sale of a drug and that the defendants were not instigated or induced to commit the
offense." The conviction was affirmed. In this case
the facts prove that there was merely a solicitation for
the sale of a stimulant drug and willing seller precluding any possibility of entr:lpment, especially under the
<:rime charged in this case.
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POlNT IV

TlIE CLOSING
BY THE
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 'V1\S NOT
PRE.JUDICIAL AS ARGUED IN POINT II
OF APPELLANT'S BRIEJT.
In State v. Jol111son, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P.2d
491, 492, ( H)70), this courl wrote:

"It is the mandate of our law, and the
policy deelared hy our statute, that a conviction
should not he reverse<l merely for any charged
error or irregularity, but only if there is one
which is substantial and prejudicial in the
sense that there is a reasonable likelihood of a
different result in its absence."
Utah Code A11n.
77--12-1 ( rn.>:J); Stnf( Z'.
Neal, 1 Utah 75u.
P.2d 7;'5li, ( H);):J);
State v. Cluff, 48 Utah 102, 158 P. 701,
( HH(>).

'l'he appellant alleges four prejwlicial statements
made by the prosecutor in his summation. A dose examination of these statements, considering all of the facts
and circumstances, together \vith the court's instructions, shows that they were harmless or at most not
prejudicial error. In appelbnt's brief at 16. the following is quoted from the Hecord at 145 wherein the prosecutor states:
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"I woulrl submit to you that Officer Hoche
told you the truth when he got up there, ...
I would submit to you that he is telling the
truth. . . ."
Appellant then cites United States v. Tamcrson, 457
F.2d 371, (5th Cir. 1!)72), as authority for the above
statement constituting reversible enor. This case can be
distinguished from the case at Bar. The court in 'l_lamerson, supra, was concerned with the following language
of the prosecutor at 372:

"I firmly believe what they said was the
truth. I know it is the truth, and I expect you
do too."
Further art.ri1ment by the prosecutor implying that the
governmeut prosecutes only the guilty resulted in the
reYersal of the defendants corwiction. The prosecutor
in Truncrson, supra, unequivocally stated that the witness v.·as telling the truth because he knew it was the
truth, wheren.s the prosecutor in this case prefaced each
statement with the work "submit", which means "to commit to the discretion of n.nother." Black's Law Dictionary ( Hevisecl i<th ed. 1!)68) . Each case is concuned with
different langauge and resulting inferences and are
Jistinguisha ble.
Hespondent in addressing sub-points B, C, and D
in appellant's brief submits that the language of the
Oklahoma Court in Young v. State, 357 P.2d 562, 571
(Old. Cr. 1960), is appropriate in eliminating any pos-
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sibility of prejudicial error, which the appellant has alleged the prosecutor committed <luring his summation
to the jury. The court stated:
"The right of argument contemplates a liberal
freedom of speech, awl the range of discussion
illustratiou, and argumentation is wide. Counsel for bc,th the State and the defendant have
a right to discuss fully from their standpoint,
the evidence and the inferences and deductions
arising from it. It is only where argument by
counsel for the State is grossly improper and
unwarranted upon some points which may have
affected defendant's rights that a reversal can
be based on improper argument."
Respondent submits that as a result of the appellant's
testimony as to the quantity of pills she took per clay
( 200 to 300 pilJs a clay a11J sometime 400, R. 128), a
reasonable layman, the prosecutor and jury included,
not knowing the effects 1hat speed has on the body
could reasonably infer that the dosage is lethal or
would he highly dangerous to one's health. Also the
fact that the appellant testified that she had heen taken
to the hospital subsequent lo a prior charge of sale and
was booked for the crime at l3ar while in the hospital
( R. 136) would infer that if the defe11dant were to be
convicted, she would receive me<lical attention and possibly hospitalized. Therefore, respondent suLmits that
the comments made by the prosecutor were not prejudicial.
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In all jury trials, the rights of both plaintiff and
defc11clant are given additional protection in the form of
the court's jury instructions. These instructions are adclresse<l to the relernnt law to he applied to the case
before the court, and the jury is required to base its
venlict on the evidence introduced during the trial and
the instructions of the court. The jury instructions in
the present case sufficiently counteracted any alleged
prejudicial comment by the prosecutor as to ·reduce it
to pure advocacy or at the most harmless error. The
appropriate instructions are as follows:
(No. 2, R. 28)
To this charge the defendant has entered a plea
of not guilty. This plea casts upon the state the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crime charged, which elements are set forth
in Instruction No. 6.
(No. 8, R. 29)
The fact that the defendant was held to answer to
this court by the committing magistrate is not a circumstance which should le considered by you in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant; nor
is the filing of the information herein such a circumstance; but in arriving at your verdict you must be
guided solely by the evidence presented at the trial and
the law given by the court.
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(No. 6, R. 31)
You are instructed that the defendant stands
charged with the felony offense of Possession for Sale
of a Stimulant Drug.
Before you can convict the defendant of this offense, the prosecution must prove to your satisfaction
and beyond a. reasonable doubt each of the following
elements:
That on or about April 30, 1971 the defendant
did unlawfully possess a stimulant drug; to wit, Amphetamine.
1.

That the defendant possessed for sale said stimulant drug.
2.

That said unlawful possess10n occurred m
\Veber County.
3.

If the State fails to prove each of the above elements to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt,
you are instructed that you should find the defendant
not guilty.

(No. 9, R. 34)
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be
innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The presumption of innocence is not a mere form
to be disregarded by the jury at pleasure, but is a substantial, essential part of' the law and is binding upon
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the jury. This presumption is a humane provision of
the law, internled, so far us human agency is capable,
to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. This presumption nttends the
<lefendant through every .stage of the trial, and if possible you should reconcile the evidence with this presumption, and in case 'Jf a reasonable doubt as to
whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, you should
ac'luit the defendant.

(No. 10, R. 34)
lly "reasonable doubt" is meant a doubt based on
reason and which is reasouable in view of all of the evidence. It must be a real "ubstantial doubt and not one
that is merely possible or imaginary. It should arise
fairly and reasonably out of the evidence or lack of
evidence in the case. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it.

(No. 11, R. 34)
If, after an entirely fair and impartial consideration and comparison of all of the evidence in the case,
you can candidly say that you are not satisfied of the
defendant's guilt, then yon have a reasonable doubt and
your verdict should be "not guilty". But, if after such
consideration of all the evidence, you have an abiding
conviction of the defendant's guilt, such as you would
be willing lo a.ct upon in the more weighty and import-
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ant matters relating to your own affairs, then you have
no reasonable doubt and your verdict sh o u I d be
"guilty."

(No. 13, R. 36)
You are the sole judges of all questions of fact,
of the weight of the evidence and the credibilitv of the
witnesses. In weighing the testimony you may consider
the hias, if any is shown of any witness to testify for
or against any party, his interest, if any, in the result
of the trial, his appearance on the witness stand, and
any probable motive which he may have to tell that
which is not true: you may consider the reasonableness
of the witnesses' statements, their apparent frankness
and candor, or the want of it, their opportunity to know
and understand, and their capacity to remember; and
from all the facts and circumstances given in evidence
determine what weight ought to be given to the testimony of any witness.
You are not bound to helieve all that the witnesses
have testified to, nor are you hound to believe any witness. You may believe one witness as against many or
many as against one. If you helien that any witness
has knowingly and willfully testified falsely as to any
material fact in the case, you may disregard his whole
testimony unless he is corroborated by other credible
evidence, or you may give such weight to the testimony
of such witness on other points as you think it is entitled. In case there is a conflict in the testimony of the
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witnesses, it is your duty to reconcile such conflict so
far as you can, hut it is still for you to determine for
yourselves where the ultimate truth of the case lies.
(No. 14: R. 37)
You should consider the evidence all together.
fairly, impartiaUy, and conscientiously. You should arrive at your verdict solely upon the evidence introduced
before you at the trial and upon the instructions of the
court. You should not consider or be influenced by any
evidence offered and not admitted by the court, nor
any evidence stricken out by the court.
(No. 15. R. 37)
These instructions, though numbered separately,
should be considered together. Each instruction should
be read and understood with reference to and as part
of the entire charge an<l not as t11ough such was intended to present the whole law of the case, as all of the
Jaw on a subject cannot be stated in a single paragraph
or in n single instruction. 'rl1e different subjects discussed in the instructions should be kept in mind and the
evidence considered and weighed in the light of all of
the instructions.

(No. 16, R. 37)
The court does not express to you any opinion on
any of the facts in the case, as it is immaterial what the
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views of the court thereon may be. Neither by these instructions nor by any words uttered or remarks made
during the trial, does the court intimate or mean or wish
to be understood as gi,'ing an opinion as to what the
proof is or what it is not, or what the facts are or what
are not the facts in this case.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the crime of
possession for sale of a stimulant drug was conclusively proved, and the closing argument by the prosecuting
attorney was not prejudicial. 'Therefore, there is no
Yalid reason why the lower court's jury verdict should
not be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON ll. ROl\1NEY,
Attorney General
DAVIDS. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
\VILLIAl\1 'T. EVANS
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